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Abstract
Countries with higher implicit taxes on continued work are associated with lower
labor force participation rates of the elderly. This paper constructs a politico-
economic model that accounts for this feature based on multiple, self-fullling ex-
pectations of agents. In this model, agents are identical at birth and can become
skilled (or remain unskilled) through educational investment. When agents hold
expectations of larger social security benets, it provides a disincentive to engage
in educational investment, thereby resulting in an unskilled majority. In turn, this
unskilled majority supports larger social security benets, which induces the retire-
ment of the elderly and thus results in a lower labor force participation rate. The
opposite applies when agents have expectations of smaller social security benets
in their old age.
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1 Introduction
The labor force participation rate of the elderly in the OECD is negatively correlated with
taxes on their continued work. For instance, Daval (2003) and Fenge and Pestieau (2005)
argue that countries in the OECD can be classied into two groups: one characterized
by a higher tax burden and lower labor force participation rate of the elderly, and the
other characterized by a lower tax burden and higher labor force participation rate of
the elderly. The former includes Austria, France, Germany and Italy; the latter includes
Canada, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Several studies have attempted to reveal the mechanism underlying this interesting
observation (see, for example, Sheshinski, 1978; Crawford and Lilien, 1981; and the recent
survey by Feldstein and Liebman, 2002). In general, continued work in older age may be
subject to the burden of payroll tax and forgone pension benets. This double burden,
regarded as an implicit tax on the elderly (Gruber and Wise, 1999), provides the elderly
with an incentive to retire earlier. That is, a higher tax burden results in earlier retirement
and thus a lower labor force participation rate of the elderly. Indeed, Gruber and Wise
(1999) argue that this implicit tax on the elderly explains more than 80% of the cross-
country variation in unused labor capacity for those 55 to 65 years of age.
All of the above-mentioned studies focus on the eect of the tax burden on retirement
decisions. However, little attention has been given to the question why some countries
choose a higher tax burden on the elderly while others select a lower tax burden, even
though they share a similar political and economic background. This paper develops a
politico-economic framework that responds to this important question, and demonstrates
how the retirement behavior of the elderly is aected by voting on taxation. We then
show the mechanism underlying the dierences in social security and retirement behavior
across the OECD countries.
Our framework is based on that developed in Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007).
In this approach, agents identical at birth can aect their prospects in life with educational
investment. In particular, agents become either skilled or unskilled, and by undertaking
costly investment can increase the probability of becoming skilled in their youth. This
framework is further enriched by allowing for endogenous retirement decisions in old
age. Here, each type of old agent obtains the opportunity to continue to work with
some probability and makes his/her decision on retirement from the viewpoint of utility
maximization. The government is assumed to provide old-age social security nanced by
taxes levied on the young and the working old.
Under the above-mentioned framework, there are multiple, self-fullling expectations
of agents. In undertaking educational investment, young agents have expectations of
social security in their old age. When young agents hold expectations of higher social
security benets, it provides a disincentive to engage in educational investment, thereby
resulting in a lower proportion of the skilled. This implies a greater number of unskilled
young individuals, which in turn increases the demand for old-age social security and
thus enhances retirement. The opposite applies when young agents have expectations
of lower social security in old age. The economy may then attain multiple equilibria,
including a skilled-majority equilibrium featuring a low tax burden and late retirement,
and an unskilled-majority equilibrium featuring a high tax burden and early retirement.
Ultimately, the particular outcome attained depends on the expectations of agents.
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The nding of multiple equilibria well ts the empirical evidence. In the skilled-
majority equilibrium, the skilled old choose a lower level of social security and thus a
lower tax burden on the working old. This gives the old an incentive to continue to work,
thereby resulting in the higher labor force participation rate of the elderly. The opposite
applies in the unskilled-majority equilibrium. In terms of real-world observations, the
skilled-majority equilibrium represents a group of countries including Canada, Norway,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and the unskilled-majority equilib-
rium comprises a group of countries including Austria, France, Germany and Italy (Daval,
2003; Fenge and Pestieau, 2005).
Interestingly, Norway and Sweden are much less unequal than Canada, the United
Kingdom and the United States, even though they present a similar level of taxes and
comparable labor force participation of the elderly. However, while the evidence of simi-
larity at rst appears counterintuitive, this can be explained by self-fullling expectations.
That is, people in Norway and Sweden happen to have similar expectations, as do those
in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, regarding future social security.
This similarity of expectations leads to an identical pattern of taxation and labor force
participation in each of the two groups of countries.
We undertake a numerical analysis of the pension{GDP ratio to enable further investi-
gation of these cross-country dierences. We nd that the unskilled-majority equilibrium
attains a higher pension{GDP ratio than the skilled-majority equilibrium, and a more
equal society realizes a lower pension{GDP ratio. This numerical result appears to t the
available empirical evidence. In fact, the ratio in Austria, France, Germany and Italy,
representing the unskilled-majority equilibrium, is about twice that of Canada, Norway,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, representing the skilled-majority
equilibrium. In addition, the evidence indicates a negative correlation between wage
equality and the size of pensions across the OECD countries.
We also pursue a numerical investigation of the expected utility of the young in order
to consider the welfare implications of wage inequality and the multiple expectations of
agents. We nd that the young obtain a higher expected utility in the skilled-majority
equilibrium than in the unskilled-majority equilibrium. This is mainly because the former
equilibrium requires a lower tax burden on the old and thus realizes a higher probability
of being successful in education. We also nd that more wage equality results in a higher
expected utility of the young in the skilled-majority equilibrium, and a lower expected
utility of the young in the unskilled-majority equilibrium. These dissimilar results appear
to arise from dierences in voting behavior in the two equilibria.
The current paper relates to the following two strands of literature. The rst strand
is the literature on the political economy of social security and retirement, including
studies focusing on early retirement provisions (Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2003, 2004),
old-age social security provisions (Profeta, 2002; Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau, 2005,
2006), and the legal retirement age (Lacomba and Lagos, 2006, 2007; Galasso, 2008). The
current paper is similar to that of Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2005, 2006) in that
we consider the political determination of social security and its impact on retirement.
However, our work diers in that we introduce a link between current economic decisions
and the expectations of future social security, and this creates the multiple, self-fullling
expectations of agents that help to explain the empirical evidence.
The second strand is the literature on the dynamic political economy of social security
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based on the concept of Markov-perfect equilibrium. This body of work includes studies
demonstrating a unique equilibrium pinned down by the initial (Grossman and Helpman,
1998; Azariadis and Galasso, 2002) and multiple, self-fullling expectations of agents
(Hassler et al., 2003; Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2007). Conde-Ruiz, Galasso and
Profeta (2005) extend the framework in the rst two studies by introducing the retirement
decisions of old agents. In contrast, the current paper extends the framework in the latter
two studies to demonstrate multiple equilibria as regards social security and retirement.
The current paper also shows that the self-fullling expectations of agents explain why
two dierent countries in terms of wage inequality display similar levels of taxes and labor
force participation of the elderly.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3
demonstrates the multiple political equilibria. Section 4 undertakes the numerical analy-
sis, and Section 5 discusses two extensions. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The model is a two-period-lived, overlapping-generations model based on that discussed in
Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007). Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0; 1; 2;    :
The economy comprises a continuum of agents living for two periods, youth and old age.
Each generation has a unit mass. Agents are identical at birth.
Consider the young agents born in period t. They can aect their prospects in life with
educational investment. In particular, they become either skilled or unskilled (denoted
by s and u, respectively), and by undertaking costly investment, they can increase the
probability et of becoming skilled in their youth. The cost of investment, measured in
terms of disutility, is given by (et)
2=2. Skilled agents earn a high wage, normalized to
unity, whereas unskilled agents earn a low wage, normalized to w 2 [0; 1) over their life
cycle. A lower w implies higher wage inequality between the two types of agents.
At the beginning of period t + 1, there are two types of old agents: the skilled and
the unskilled. Our model departs from Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) in the
following respects. First, in old age, each agent faces job loss with a probability of
1    2 [0; 1] because of job replacement or deterioration in health. However, they may
obtain opportunities to continue to work with a probability of . The situation where
these opportunities dier between skilled and unskilled old agents will be examined in
Section 4. Second, the cost of continuing to work is given by (ljt+1)
2=2 (j = s; u), where
ljt+1 2 [0; 1] is the amount of labor supplied by a type-j old agent. Figure 1 illustrates the
timing of events.
[Figure 1 about here.]
There is no storage technology in this economy: each individual uses his/her endow-
ments within a given period. The government provides old-age social security, b, nanced
by taxes levied on the young and the working old. The tax rates are age dependent:  o
for the old and  y for the young. In turn, the tax rates are determined before the young
agents decide on their investment and before the old agents decide on their retirement.
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Therefore, the expected utility functions of the agents alive at time t are given as follows:
V ost = 

lst (1   ot ) 
(lst )
2
2

+ bt; (1)
V out = 

wlut (1   ot ) 
(lut )
2
2

+ bt; (2)
V yt = et(1   yt ) + (1  et)w(1   yt ) 
(eyt )
2
2
+ 

et



lst+1(1   ot+1) 
(lst+1)
2
2

+ bt+1

+(1  eyt )



wlut+1(1   ot+1) 
(lut+1)
2
2

+ bt+1

; (3)
where V ost ; V
ou
t and V
y
t denote the utility of the skilled old, the utility of the unskilled
old, and the expected utility of the young, respectively. The utility levels of V ost , V
ou
t
and V yt are computed prior to individual success or failure in education. The parameter
 2 (0; 1) is a discount factor.
Given these preferences, the skilled old agent chooses lst to maximize V
os
t ; the unskilled
old agent chooses lut to maximize V
ou
t ; and the young agent in period t chooses et to
maximize V yt by taking account of the optimal labor supply in his/her old age, l
s
t+1 and
lut+1. The optimal choices of the old and the young are respectively given by:
ls( ot ) = 1   ot ; lu( ot ) = w(1   ot ); (4)
ey( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (1  w)

(1   yt ) + (1 + w)(1   ot+1)2=2

: (5)
Young agents are ex ante identical, and therefore agents in the same cohort choose
the same investment. This implies that at the beginning of period t + 1, the proportion
of the unskilled old, ut+1, is equal to the proportion of the unsuccessful period-t young
agents, 1  ey( yt ;  ot+1):
ut+1  1  ey( yt ;  ot+1) = 1  (1  w)

(1   yt ) + (1 + w)(1   ot+1)2=2

:
The proportion of the unskilled old at the time of voting, ut+1, depends on the tax levied
on the young in period t,  yt , and the tax levied on working old agents in period t + 1,
 ot+1.
The tax revenues from the young and the working old are transferred to every old
agent in a lump-sum fashion. The government budget is balanced in each period so it can
be expressed as:
bt = W (
o
t ; ut) + Z(
y
t ; 
o
t+1);
where W ( ot ; ut) is the tax revenue from the old and Z(
y
t ; 
o
t+1) is the tax revenue from
the young, dened by:
W ( ot ; ut)  f(1  ut) + utw2g(1   ot ) ot ;
Z( yt ; 
o
t+1) 

w + (1  w)2 (1   yt ) + (1 + w)(1   ot+1)2=2	  yt :
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3 Political Equilibria
This section characterizes the political equilibria where agents vote on taxation period
by period. Section 3.1 provides the denition of a political equilibrium based on the
concept of a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium with majority voting. Sections 3.2
and 3.3 provide the characterization of political equilibria classied according to the type
of majority.
3.1 Denition of Political Equilibrium
Following Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007), we assume that elections are held at
the end of each period and the elected politicians set the tax rates for the following period.
The old abstain from voting because they have no interest in the following period; only
the young participate in voting. This is observationally equivalent to assuming that only
old agents vote over current taxes at the beginning of each period. We adopt the latter in-
terpretation in the following analysis. Our assumption about voting implies that we focus
on the intragenerational, rather than intergenerational, conict over redistribution. With
optimal choices ls( ot ); l
u( ot ) and e
( yt ; 
o
t+1) and the government budget constraint, the
indirect utility functions of the skilled and the unskilled old are respectively given by:
V ost =

2
(1   ot )2 +W ( ot ; ut) + Z( yt ;  ot+1);
V out =

2
(w)2(1   ot )2 +W ( ot ; ut) + Z( yt ;  ot+1);
where the term (1  ot )2=2 in the rst line is the expected after-tax income of the skilled
old, the term (w)2(1   ot )2=2 in the second line is the expected after-tax income of the
unskilled old, and the term W ( ot ; ut) + Z(
y
t ; 
o
t+1) is the old-age social security benet.
This paper focuses on stationary Markov-perfect equilibria with majority voting. The
proportion of the unskilled old (ut) summarizes the state of the economy; the identity of
a decisive voter depends on this proportion. An oce-seeking politician elected by voters
sets policies to maximize the utility of the larger group. Given these features, we now
provide the denition of the political equilibrium as follows.
Denition: A (stationary Markov-perfect) political equilibrium is dened as a triplet
of functions fT o; T y; Ug, where T o : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] and T y are two public policy
rules,  ot = T
o(ut) and 
y
t = T
y, and U : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is a private decision rule,
ut+1 = U(
y
t ), such that given u0, the following functional equations hold.
1. T o(ut) = argmaxot 2[0;1]W
dec( ot ; ut) (dec = os; ou), where:
W dec( ot ; ut) =

W os( ot ; ut)  2 (1   ot )2 +W ( ot ; ut) if ut  1=2;
W ou( ot ; ut)  2 (w)2(1   ot )2 +W ( ot ; ut) if ut > 1=2
2. U( yt ) = 1  e( yt ;  ot+1), with  ot+1 = T o(U( yt ))
3. T y = argmaxot 2[0;1] Z(
y
t ; 
o
t+1) subject to 
o
t+1 = T
o(U( yt ))
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The rst equilibrium condition requires that the decisive voter chooses  ot to maximize
the utility of the skilled old (if ut < 1=2) or the unskilled old (if ut > 1=2). In the case of
equal numbers of skilled and unskilled old agents (i.e., ut = 1=2), the skilled old are as-
sumed to be decisive. The second equilibrium condition implies that all young individuals
choose their investment optimally, given  yt and 
o
t+1, under rational expectations about
future taxes and the distribution of types. The third equilibrium condition requires that
the decisive old voter chooses  yt to maximize revenue from the young. Rational voters
understand that their choice over current redistribution aects future redistribution via
the private decision rule and public policy.
3.2 The Determination of T o and U
We now solve the equilibrium conditions recursively. Condition 1 denes a one-to-one
mapping from the state variable to the equilibrium choice of taxation of the old:  ot =
T o(ut). Suppose that the skilled old form the majority: ut  1=2. The objective function
of the majority is given by W os( ot ; ut)  (1    ot )2=2 + W ( ot ; ut), which is strictly
decreasing in  ot : @W
os( ot ; ut)=@
o
t < 0. The skilled old pay more than they receive
because the unskilled agents pay less than the skilled agents, but the revenue is distributed
equally between the skilled and unskilled old agents. Therefore, the skilled old prefer
 ot = 0:
T o(ut) = 0 if ut 2

0;
1
2

. (6)
Alternatively, suppose that the unskilled old form the majority: ut > 1=2. The
objective function of the majority is given by W ou( ot ; ut)  (w)2(1   ot )2=2+W ( ot ; ut),
which has the following properties:
@W ou( ot ; ut)
@ ot

ot =0
= (1  ut)(1  (w)2) > 0;
@W ou( ot ; ut)
@ ot

ot =1=2
=  1
2
(w)2 < 0;
@2W ou( ot ; ut)
@ o2t
 =   2(1  ut) + (1  2ut)(w)2 < 0:
Given these properties, there is a unique tax rate  ot that maximizes W
ou( ot ; ut) :
argmax
ot
W ou( ot ; ut) =
(1  ut)(1  (w)2)
2(1  ut) + (w)2(2ut   1) 2

0;
1
2

:
The optimal tax rate chosen by the unskilled old depends on the population of the
unskilled old agents, ut. This makes it impossible to obtain an analytic solution. In fact,
the model without retirement decisions (Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2007) could
derive an analytic solution because the unskilled old choose  ot = 1 irrespective of the
state variable ut. The state-independent tax rates on the old enable us to attain analyti-
cally tractable solutions of multiple, self-fullling expectations of agents when employing
the Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) framework. In order to retain analytical
tractability, we impose the following assumption regarding the choice of the tax rate by
the unskilled old.
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Assumption 1. The politically available tax rates for the old are limited within the
range [0;  o], where  o 2 (0; 1) satises @W ou( ot ; ut)=@ ot jot =o > 0.
Figure 2 illustrates a situation where Assumption 1 holds. The unskilled old wish to
choose the tax rate that attains the top of the Laer curveW ou( ot ; ut): 
o
t = argmaxW
ou( ot ; ut).
However, Assumption 1 restricts their available choices to [0;  o] because of some institu-
tional or political constraint. Given this restriction, the unskilled old choose  ot = 
o from
the viewpoint of utility maximization. Under Assumption 1, the mapping that satises
Equilibrium Condition 1 is summarized as follows:
T o(ut) =

0 if ut  12 ;
 o if ut >
1
2
:
(7)
[Figure 2 about here.]
Next, we rewrite Equilibrium Condition 2 by substituting in the optimal investment
ey( yt ; 
o
t+1). This yields the following functional equation:
U( yt ) = 1  (1  w)

(1   yt ) +

2
(1 + w) (1  T o(U( yt )))2

; (8)
where T o() is given by (7). We derive the solution to the functional equation (8) by
assuming rational expectations. The solution to the functional equation (8) is given by:
U( yt ) =

U( yt ; 0)  1  (1  w)

(1   yt ) + 2 (1 + w)
	
if  yt   y
U( yt ; 
o)  1  (1  w)(1   yt ) + 2 (1 + w) (1   o)2	 if  yt >  y (9)
where  y and  y are dened as:
 y  1 +  1 + (1  w)(1 + w)
2(1  w) ;
 y  1 +  1 + (1  w)(1 + w) (1  
o)2
2(1  w) :
The interpretation of (9) is as follows. Suppose that the agents in period t expect
 ot+1 = 0. Under this expectation, young agents choose their investment as e
y( yt ; 0) =
(1   w) [(1   yt ) + (1 + w)=2]. By (7), this expectation is rational if 1   ey( yt ; 0) 
1=2; that is, if  yt   y. Next, suppose that the young agents in period t expect
 ot+1 = 
o. Under this expectation, young agents choose their investment as ey( yt ; 
o) =
(1   w) [(1   yt ) + (1 + w)(1   o)2=2]. By (7), their expectation is rational if 1  
ey( yt ; 
o) > 1=2; that is, if  yt > 
y. Figure 3 illustrates an example of the solutions to
the functional equation (9).
[Figure 3 about here.]
There are multiple, self-fullling expectations of U for the set of  yt 2 [ y;  y]. The
particular U that arises in equilibrium depends on the expectations of agents. To illustrate
U in equilibrium, we follow the method in Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) and
introduce the critical rate of  yt :  2 (max(0;  y);  y]. The rate , which depends on the
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expectations of agents, is the highest tax rate that can yield a majority of the unskilled
old. For  yt > , the majority is the unskilled old; however, for 
y
t 2 (max(0;  y); ], the
majority can be either the skilled or the unskilled old depending on agents' expectations.
Given the denition of , the solution is now given by:
U( yt ) =
8<:
U( yt ; 0) if 
y
t  max(0;  y)
fU( yt ; 0); U( yt ;  o)g if max(0;  y) <  yt  
U( yt ; 
o) if  <  yt :
(10)
Figure 4 illustrates three possible cases of the solution in (10).
[Figure 4 about here.]
3.3 The Determination of T y and Characterization of the Polit-
ical Equilibria
Given the characterization of T o and U satisfying Equilibrium Conditions 1 and 2, re-
spectively, we now consider the political determination of  yt that satises Equilibrium
Condition 3. Because there are two possible cases of a majority, we introduce correspond-
ing denitions of the political equilibria: a skilled-majority equilibrium and an unskilled-
majority equilibrium. In particular, the rst equilibrium condition given by (7) implies
that when the majority are skilled, there is a skilled-majority equilibrium where agents
expect no taxation on the old in the future ( ot+1 = 0) and choose 
y
t to induce a majority
of skilled at time t+1 (ut+1  1=2). In contrast, when the majority are unskilled, there is
an unskilled-majority equilibrium where agents expect taxation on the old in the future
( ot+1 = 
o) and choose  yt to induce a majority of unskilled at time t+ 1 (ut+1 > 1=2).
In order to nd a  yt that satises Equilibrium Condition 3, we note the following
properties: (i) Z( yt ; 0) > Z(
y
t ; 
o)8 yt 2 [0; 1]; (ii) Z( yt ; 0) and Z( yt ;  o) attain the tops
of the Laer curves at  yt = 
ys and  yu, respectively, where:
 ys  argmaxZ( yt ; 0) =
1
2(1  w)2

w + (1  w)2

1 +

2
(1 + w)

;
 yu  argmaxZ( yt ;  o) =
1
2(1  w)2

w + (1  w)2

1 +

2
(1 + w)(1   o)2

;
and (iii) the expectations of  ot+1 = 0 and 
o are rational if and only if  yt  (  y) and
 yt > 
y, respectively. Given these properties, the revenue from the young is illustrated
in Figure 5.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 5 depict the skilled-majority equilibrium; that is, the
revenue from the young is maximized under the expectation of  ot+1 = 0. In particular,
Panel (a) demonstrates the case where  ys   y holds. Under this condition, agents can
choose  yt = 
ys irrespective of the expectation parameter . Revenue is maximized by
choosing  yt = 
ys. In contrast, Panel (b) illustrates the case where  ys >  y holds. Agents
may have an opportunity of choosing  yt = 
ys under the expectation of  ot+1 = 0, but the
choice depends on the expectation of . The choice of  yt = 
ys is feasible if  is high such
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that    ys; however, it is unfeasible if  is low such that  <  ys. Under the expectation
of  ot+1 = 0, revenue is maximized by setting 
y
t = min(; 
ys), where  yt = 
ys is included
as a special case.
Panels (c) and (d) illustrate the unskilled-majority equilibrium; that is, revenue from
the young is maximized under the expectation of  ot+1 = 
o. In particular, Panel (c)
demonstrates the case where  yu  1, that is, it is feasible to attain the top of the
Laer curve Z( yt ; 
o), while Panel (d) demonstrates the case where  yu > 1, that is,
it is unfeasible to attain the top of the Laer curve. In both cases, the expectation 
is assumed to be low, implying that the concerned choice that produces the unskilled-
majority equilibrium dominates the option of ( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (; 0) that produces the skilled-
majority equilibrium in terms of revenue from the young.
Before proceeding to the analysis, we dene the following four equations that help us
characterize the political equilibria:
 = f 1(w)  w(2  w)
(1 + w)(1  w)2 f(1   o)2   1=2g ;
 = f 2(w)  2w
2   5w + 1
(1  w)(1 + w)[ (1 + w) + 2(1  w)2(1   o)2] ;
 = f 3(w)  (1 + w)  ffw + (1  w)
2g(1   o)2g   py
(1   o)4(1  w)2(1 + w)=2 ;
 = f 4(w)  2(w
2   3w + 1)
(1 + w)(1  w)2(1   o)2 ;
where y in f 3(w) is given by:
y  fw + (1  w)2g(1   o)2   (1 + w)2   (1   o)4(w(2  w))2:
The implications of these equations are described below. The graphs of these equations
are illustrated in Figure 6. As depicted in the gure, there is a unique level of w, denoted
by w^, where f 2, f 3 and f 4 cross: f 2(w) = f 3(w) = f 4(w) at w = w^.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Using these equations, we provide a characterization of each type of equilibrium in
turn. We rst provide the characterization of the skilled-majority equilibria.
Proposition 1
(i) Suppose the following conditions hold:
 o 2
 
0;
2 p2
2
!
and   f 1(w):
There exists a set of skilled-majority equilibria such that 8t, T o is given by (7), U
is given by (10), and T y =  ys. The equilibrium outcome is unique and such that
8t,  yt =  ys;  ot = 0, and ut = 1  (1  w)f(1   ys) + (1 + w)=2g.
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(ii) Suppose the following three conditions hold:8><>:
 o 2
h
2 p2
2
; 1
2

; or  o 2

0; 2 
p
2
2

and  < f 1(w);
  f 2(w); and
  f 3(w):
There exists a set of skilled-majority equilibria such that 8t, T o is given by (7), U
is given by (10), and T y = min(;  ys). The equilibrium outcome is indeterminate
such that 8t,  yt = min(;  ys);  ot = 0, and ut = 1   (1   w)f(1   min(;  ys)) +
(1 + w)=2g.
Proof. See Appendix 7.1.
Areas P.1(i) and P.1(ii) in Figure 6 indicate the set of parameters (w; ) satisfying
the equilibrium conditions in Statements (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1, respectively. The
assumption in Statement (i) ensures that it is feasible to choose  yt = 
ys under the
expectation of  ot+1 = 0 irrespective of the expectation parameter . Because this choice
attains the top of the Laer curve Z( yt ; 0), the choice dominates any other pair of tax rates
from the viewpoint of tax revenue maximization (see Panel (a) in Figure 5). A unique
equilibrium with ( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (
ys; 0) then exists when the assumption in Statement (i)
holds.
The rst assumption in Statement (ii), which is the exact opposite of the rst assump-
tion in Statement (i), implies that the choice of  yt depends on the expectations parameter
 when agents expect  ot+1 = 0. In other words, it is unfeasible to set 
y
t = 
ys irrespec-
tive of . For example, the decisive voter cannot choose  yt = 
ys if  is low such that
 <  ys; however, he/she can choose  yt = 
ys if  is high such that    ys. The choice
of the decisive voter depends on the expectations of agents represented by the parameter
. The revenue from the young is maximized by setting  yt = min(; 
ys), and thus the
equilibrium outcome becomes indeterminate, as illustrated by Panel (b) in Figure 5.
Under the current situation, there is either of the following alternative choices for the
decisive voter: setting  yt = 1 under the expectation of 
o
t+1 = 
o if  yu > 1, and setting
 yt = 
yu under the expectation of  ot+1 = 
o if  yu  1. The concerned choice is sustained
against these two alternatives if Z(; 0)  Z(1;  o) and Z(; 0)  Z( yu;  o); that is, if
  ~ and   ^ where:
~   ys  
p
( ys   1)2 + 2( ys    yu);
^   ys  
p
( ys)2   ( yu)2:
Figure 7 illustrates the determination of ~ and ^. Details of the derivation of ~ and ^
are given in the Appendix. Because  is bounded from above  y, Z(; 0)  Z(1;  o) and
Z(; 0)  Z( yu;  o) hold if  2 [~;  y] and  2 [^;  y]. The second and third assumptions
in Statement (ii) ensure that [~;  y] and [^;  y] are nonempty.
[Figure 7 about here.]
The next proposition establishes the conditions for the existence of the unskilled-
majority equilibria.
Proposition 2
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(i) Suppose the following conditions hold:(
 o 2
h
2 p2
2
; 1
2

; or  o 2

0; 2 
p
2
2

and  < f 1(w); and
  f 4(w):
There exists a set of unskilled-majority equilibria such that 8t, T o is given by (7), U
is given by (10), and T y =  yu. The equilibrium outcome is unique such that 8t,
 yt = 
yu;  ot = 
o, and ut = 1  (1  w)f(1   yu) + (1 + w)(1   o)2=2g.
(ii) Suppose the following conditions hold:(
 o 2
h
2 p2
2
; 1
2

; or  o 2

0; 2 
p
2
2

and  < f 1(w); and
 > f 4(w):
There exists a set of unskilled-majority equilibria such that 8t, T o is given by (7),
U is given by (10), and T y = 1. The equilibrium outcome is unique such that 8t,
 yt = 1; 
o
t = 
o, and ut = 1  (1  w)(1 + w)(1   o)2=2.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
Areas P.2(i) and P.2(ii) in Figure 6 indicate the set of parameters (w; ) satisfying the
equilibrium conditions in Statements (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2, respectively. The rst
assumptions in Statements (i) and (ii) are identical to the rst assumption in Statement
(ii) of Proposition 1. These mean that it is not always feasible to choose  yt = 
ys under
the expectation of  ot+1 = 0. When this choice is always feasible, the choice dominates
any pair of tax rates that induces the unskilled-majority equilibrium.
The second assumption in each statement determines the tax rate on the young  yt
that maximizes the revenue from the young under the expectation of  ot+1 = 
o. The
second assumption in Statement (i) is equivalent to  yu  1, implying that it is feasible
to choose a  yt = 
yu that attains the top of the Laer curve under the expectation of
 ot+1 = 
o. In contrast, the second assumption in Statement (ii) is equivalent to  yu > 1,
implying that it is unfeasible to choose  yt = 
yu.
Given the argument thus far, we can conclude that the revenue from the young is
maximized by choosing  yt = min(; 
ys) under the expectation of  ot+1 = 0, or by choosing
 yt = min(
yu; 1) under the expectation of  ot+1 = 
o. The latter dominates the former
if Z(min(1;  yu);  o) > Z(; 0); that is, if  < min(~; ^). There then exists an unskilled-
majority equilibrium under the conditions presented in Proposition 2 as long as agents
attach a low value to the expectation parameter .
The following proposition summarizes the results established thus far. The proof of
the proposition is immediately apparent from Figure 6.
Proposition 3
(i) Suppose the following conditions hold:
 o 2
 
0;
2 p2
2
!
and   f 1(w):
There exists a unique skilled-majority equilibrium as in Proposition 1(i).
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(ii) Suppose the following conditions hold:8><>:
 o 2
h
2 p2
2
; 1
2

; or  o 2

0; 2 
p
2
2

and  < f 1(w);
  f 3(w) for w 2 [0; w^];
  f 2(w) for w 2 (w^; 1):
Then the equilibrium is indeterminate. There exists both a skilled-majority equilib-
rium, as in Proposition 1(ii), and an unskilled-majority equilibrium, as in Propo-
sition 2(i), if   f 4(w); there exist both a skilled-majority equilibrium as in
Proposition 1(ii) and an unskilled-majority equilibrium, as in Proposition 2(ii), if
 > f 4(w).
(iii) Suppose the following conditions hold:
 < f 3(w) for w 2 [0; w^];
 < f 2(w) for w 2 (w^; 1):
There exists a unique unskilled-majority equilibrium, as in Proposition 2(i), if  
f 4(w); there exists a unique unskilled-majority equilibrium as in Proposition 2(ii) if
 > f 4(w).
Statement (i) in Proposition 3 imposes two assumptions,  o 2  0; (2 p2)=2 and
  f 1(w), for the existence of a unique skilled-majority equilibria with  y =  ys and
 o = 0. The rst assumption implies a low tax burden in old age; the second assumption
implies a low wage for unskilled workers. These assumptions jointly create an incentive
for young agents to invest in education, thereby resulting in a high probability of being
successful in education and thus a high ratio of skilled to unskilled workers within a
generation. Unskilled-majority equilibrium cannot arise under these assumptions because
they strongly induce a skilled-majority equilibrium.
If one of the above assumptions is relaxed, there arises an unskilled-majority equi-
librium, as in Statements (ii) and (iii). The incentive for educational investment is then
reduced because of a higher tax burden on the old and/or a higher wage for unskilled work-
ers. In addition, the skilled workers may fail to attain the top of the Laer curve. That
is, under the expectation of  ot+1 = 0, the revenue from the young is maximized by setting
 yt =  rather than 
y
t = 
ys. This equilibrium outcome depends on the expectations of
agents and thus becomes indeterminate in the skilled-majority equilibrium.
A skilled-majority equilibrium and an unskilled-majority equilibrium coexist if the
wage for unskilled workers is low such that the assumptions in Statement (ii) hold. Which
particular equilibrium arises depends on the expectation of agents: the skilled-majority
(the unskilled-majority) equilibrium arises when  is high (low) such that Z(; 0)  (<
)Z(min( yu; 1);  o) holds. In contrast, when the wage for the unskilled is high such that
the assumptions in Statement (iii) hold, young agents have little incentive for educational
investment. There no longer remains a skilled-majority equilibrium; that is, there is a
unique unskilled-majority equilibrium, as in Statement (iii).
The model prediction of multiple equilibria in Statement (ii) is consistent with the
empirical evidence for OECD countries. As demonstrated in Daval (2003), we can classify
countries in the OECD into two groups in terms of their implicit taxes on continued work
and the labor force participation of the elderly. The rst, featuring high tax rates and
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low labor force participation rates, includes Austria, France, Germany and Italy. The
second, featuring low tax rates and high labor force participation rates, includes Canada,
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The former group of
countries corresponds to the unskilled-majority equilibrium with  ot = 
o, ls( o) = 1   o
and lu( o) = w(1   o), whereas the latter group of countries corresponds to the skilled-
majority equilibrium with  ot = 0, l
s(0) = 1 and lu(0) = w. The current model then
provides at least one possible explanation for the dierences in implicit tax on continued
work and labor force participation rates of the elderly across the OECD. The key to this
explanation is the multiple, self-fullling expectations of agents.
We should note that Norway and Sweden are much less unequal than Canada, the
United Kingdom and the United States, even though all present similar levels of taxes
and labor force participation of the elderly. This evidence of similarity at rst appears
counterintuitive. However, the similarity can be explained, using our framework, by the
expectation-based tax rate on the young in the skilled-majority equilibrium. That is,
people in Norway and Sweden have similar expectations  as in those in Canada, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. This similarity of expectations leads to the
same pattern of taxation and comparable labor force participation of the elderly for the
two dierent groups of countries.
4 Numerical Analysis
Until now, we have characterized the political equilibrium and qualitatively assessed the
impact of wage inequality and the expectations of agents on the determination of the
taxation and labor force participation rate of the elderly. To facilitate understanding,
this section numerically investigates how wage inequality and the expectations of agents
aect the pension{GDP ratio as well as the expected utility of the young.
For the purpose of the analysis, we assume a generation to be 20 years in duration.
The rst and second periods correspond to, for example, ages 26{45 and 46{65 years,
respectively. The parameters  and  o are assumed to be 0.8 and 0.25, respectively. Our
selection of  is based on the single-period discount rate of 0.95. Because the agents under
the current assumption plan over generations that span 20 years, we discount the future
by (0:95)20.
In the current environment, there are three threshold levels of w, as illustrated in
Figure 6: w = 0:0090; 0:2227, and 0:3642. For w 2 (0; 0:0090), there exists a unique
skilled-majority equilibrium as in Proposition 1(i); for w 2 (0:0090; 0:2227), there exist
multiple political equilibria: one is the skilled-majority equilibrium as in Proposition
1(ii), and the other is the unskilled-majority equilibrium as in Proposition 2(i); for w 2
(0:2227; 0:3624), there exists a unique unskilled majority equilibrium as in Proposition
2(i); and for w 2 (0:3642; 1), there exists a unique unskilled-majority equilibrium as in
Proposition 2(ii). We hereafter focus on the range (0:0090; 0:2227) that creates multiple
political equilibria because these provide an explanation for the cross-country dierences
in the tax and labor force participation rate of the elderly as presented in the previous
section.
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4.1 Cross-country Dierences in the Pension{GDP Ratio
Panel (a) in Figure 8 demonstrates how the pension{GDP ratio is aected by wage
inequality in the current sample economy. The upper curve shows the pension{GDP
ratio in the unskilled-majority equilibrium, whereas the lower set of downward-sloping
curves indicates the pension{GDP ratio in the skilled-majority equilibria. As illustrated,
the unskilled-majority equilibrium attains a higher pension{GDP ratio than the skilled-
majority equilibrium. This is mainly because the tax on the old in the former equilibrium
is higher than that in the latter equilibrium.
[Figure 8 about here.]
The numerical result in Panel (a) ts the empirical evidence of Panel (b) in the follow-
ing ways. First, the evidence indicates that the ratios in Austria, France, Germany and
Italy are about twice those in Canada, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Multiple equilibria in the current framework can provide a possible expla-
nation for this dierence in the pension{GDP ratio between the two groups of countries
sharing similar levels of wage inequality.1
Second, the evidence indicates a negative correlation between wage equality and the
pension{GDP ratio in most countries, except Austria, France, Germany and Italy. A
more equal society generally realizes a lower pension{GDP ratio. This correlation can be
explained in the current framework by focusing on the set of downward-sloping curves in
the skilled-majority equilibria, where more equality in wages is associated with a lower
tax on the young2, which results in a lower per capita tax revenue and thus a smaller
pension.
4.2 Expected Utility of the Young
Panel (a) in Figure 9 illustrates the expected utility of the young. As shown, the young
obtain a higher expected utility in the skilled-majority equilibrium than in the unskilled-
majority equilibrium. This is mainly because the skilled-majority equilibrium requires a
lower tax burden on the old and thus realizes a higher probability of being successful in
education than the unskilled-majority equilibrium.
[Figure 9 about here.]
One noteworthy feature is that eects of wage equality on expected utility are dierent
between the two equilibria. In the skilled-majority equilibrium, more equality (i.e., a
higher w) leads to the higher expected utility of the young. However, in the unskilled-
majority equilibrium, more equality results in lower expected utility. These dierences
in the consequences of wage equality arise from the tax on the young (see Panel (b) in
Figure 9).
1We should note that the range of w in Panel (a) is qualitatively dierent from that in Panel (b). This
dierence comes from the assumption of the xed tax rate on the old, o, and the model specication of
the disutility functions of education and the labor supply. Changes in o and the utility functions would
derive the range of w that ts the empirical evidence.
2The mechanism underlying this eect is explained in Subsection 4.2.
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In the unskilled-majority equilibrium, more equality results in a higher tax rate on
the young. A higher w gives agents a disincentive to invest in education because they can
obtain a higher wage, even when they fail in education and become poor. This results in
fewer skilled agents and thus a smaller tax base. Given the shrinkage of the tax base, the
decisive voter chooses to impose a higher tax on the young to maintain tax revenue and
thus the level of pension benet. Therefore, more equality results in a higher tax rate
on the young and thus the lower expected utility of the young in the unskilled-majority
equilibrium.
In the skilled-majority equilibrium, more equality results in a lower tax rate on the
young and thus the higher expected utility of the young. This opposing result to the
unskilled-majority equilibrium comes about in the following way. As indicated above, a
higher wage for the unskilled gives agents a disincentive to invest in education, thereby
resulting in fewer skilled agents. A lower tax on the young osets this negative size eect
and thus keeps the majority skilled. Therefore, more equality results in a lower tax rate
on the young and thus a higher expected utility of the young in the skilled-majority
equilibrium.
5 Extensions and Further Analysis
The analysis thus far has assumed that: (i) opportunities to continue to work are common
to both the skilled and the unskilled; and (ii) the same pension benets are paid to the
skilled and the unskilled. This section briey considers how the analysis and the results
are changed when each of these assumptions is relaxed.
5.1 Dierent Opportunities for Working in Old Age
The analysis in the previous sections assumed that opportunities to continue to work are
common to both the skilled and the unskilled. However, the skilled (i.e., the rich) may
have more opportunities to work than the unskilled (i.e., the poor) because the rich are
healthier than the poor, as observed in some empirical studies (see Smith, 1999, and the
references therein). This subsection introduces dierences in opportunities into the model
and briey considers the consequences.
Assume that the probability of obtaining opportunities to work in old age is  for the
unskilled (as in the original model), whereas it is (> ) for the skilled where  > 1
holds. Under this assumption, the utility function of the unskilled old is still given by (2),
whereas the utility function of the skilled old is given by:
V ost = 

lst (1   ot ) 
(lst )
2
2

+ bt:
Educational investment by the young is now given as follows:
ey( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (1  w)

(1   yt ) +

2

   1
1  w + (1 + w)

(1   ot+1)2

:
This equation indicates that a larger  results in a higher probability of becoming skilled in
youth. The economy would then be more likely to attain the skilled-majority equilibrium
if the skilled could obtain a higher probability of opportunities to work in old age.
16
5.2 Contribution-related Pension
Pension schemes in many OECD countries feature a mixture of Beveridgean and Bis-
marckian characteristics. The purely Beveridgean system provides a lump-sum benet to
every agent, irrespective of his/her contribution (as in the model in previous sections).
In contrast, the purely Bismarckian system gives the benet to each agent depending on
his/her contribution in their youth.
Under a mixture of the Beveridgean and Bismarckian systems, the government budget
constraint is given by:
[(1  ut) + utfw + (1  )g] bt = ~W ( ot ; ut) + ~Z( yt ;  ot+1);
where the parameter  2 [0; 1] represents the Bismarckian factor, and ~W ( ot ; ut) and
~Z( yt ; 
o
t+1) are the tax revenues from the old and young, respectively:
~W ( ot ; ut) 
W ( ot ; ut)
(1  ut) + utfw + (1  )g ;
~Z( yt ; 
o
t+1) 
Z( yt ; 
o
t+1)
(1  ut) + utfw + (1  )g :
The pension system becomes purely Beveridgean if  = 0; the system is purely Bismar-
ckian if  = 1.
The objective functions of the old then change to:
V ost =

2
(1   ot )2 + ~W ( ot ; ut) + ~Z( yt ;  ot+1);
V out =

2
(w)2(1   ot )2 + ~W ( ot ; ut) + ~Z( yt ;  ot+1):
The rich old prefer  ot = 0, whereas the poor old prefer 
o
t = 
o under Assumption 1. The
qualitative properties of the analysis and the results of previous sections would then not
change if a contribution-related pension system were introduced into the model.
6 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the negative correlation between the labor force participation rate
of the elderly and the implicit tax on continued work in older ages. Some previous studies
demonstrate the mechanism of how a higher tax gives the elderly an incentive to retire
early and thus results in their lower participation rate. However, few studies show why
some countries choose a lower tax rate while others choose a higher tax rate. We develop
a politico-economic model with endogenous retirement decisions to answer this question.
A key feature of our analysis that is of importance to the result is the multiple,
self-fullling expectations of agents. When young agents hold expectations of a higher
social security benet, it provides a disincentive to engage in educational investment,
thereby resulting in a lower proportion of the skilled. This implies a majority of unskilled
individuals choosing a higher social security benet. This induces retirement and results
in the lower labor force participation rate of the elderly. The opposite applies when young
agents have expectations of lower social security in their old age. This nding of multiple
political equilibria well ts the empirical evidence for the OECD.
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We undertake numerical analysis to consider how wage inequality between the skilled
and the unskilled aects the size of the pension as well as the expected utility of the
young. The results show that the predictions of our model well t observations of the
pension{GDP ratio in the OECD _The results also show that a reduction in wage inequality
has opposite eects on the expected utility of the young depending on the equilibria.
To obtain these results, we imposed a restriction on the set of tax rates available for the
old. Because of this restriction, we were able to obtain an analytically tractable solution
for the model. While we would expect that expanding the set of tax rates available would
provide additional insights, we defer this to future work.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Suppose that at time t, agents know that  yt = 
ys and expect  ot+1 = 0. Then:
ut+1 = 1  (1  w)

(1   ys) + (1 + w)
2

 1
2
:
By (7), this implies that  ot+1 = 0, fullling initial expectations. Therefore, there exists
a skilled-majority equilibrium with  ot+1 = 0 if the decisive voter nds it optimal to set
 yt = 
ys.
To establish that setting  yt = 
ys is optimal under the expectation of  ot+1 = 0 for the
decisive voter, we note the following properties of the function Z : Z( yt ; 0) attain the top
of the Laer curve at  yt = 
ys; and Z( yt ; 0) > Z(
y
t ; 
o)8 yt 2 [0; 1]. These properties
imply that setting  yt = 
ys is optimal for any  if  ys   y( ) (see Panel (a) in Figure
5). The inequality  ys   y is rewritten as:
w(2  w) 

(1   o)2   1
2

(1 + w)(1  w)2;
where the left-hand side is positive; and the right-hand side is positive if and only if
 o 2  0; (2 p2)=2. Therefore,  ys   y is rewritten as  o 2  0; (2 p2)=2 and
  f 1(w)  w(2  w)=[(1 + w)(1  w)2 f(1   o)2   1=2g].
(ii) Suppose that at time t, agents know that  yt =  and expect 
o
t+1 = 0. Then:
ut+1 = 1  (1  w)

(1  ) + (1 + w)
2

<
1
2
:
By (7), this implies that  ot+1 = 0, fullling initial expectations. Therefore, there exists
a skilled-majority equilibrium with  ot+1 = 0 if the decisive voter nds it optimal to set
 yt = .
To establish that setting  yt =  is optimal for the decisive voter, we rst note that the
rst assumption in Statement (ii) lies opposite to the assumption in Statement (i); that
is,  ys >  y holds under the rst assumption. Under this condition, the decisive voter
nds it optimal to choose  yt = max(; 
ys) from the viewpoint of revenue maximization
when he/she expects  ot+1 = 0.
Given the result above, either of the following options can oppose the choice of
( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (; 0): setting 
y
t = 1 under the expectation of 
o
t+1 = 
o if  yu > 1; or
setting  yt = 
yu under the expectation of  ot+1 = 
o if  yu  1. The concerned choice is
sustained against the rst option if Z(; 0)  Z(1;  o); that is:
()2   2 ys   (1  2 yu)  0,   ~;
where:
~   ys  
p
( ys   1)2 + 2( ys    yu):
As  is bounded above  y, Z(; 0)  Z(1;  o) holds if and only if  2 [~;  y]. The set
[~;  y] is nonempty if and only if ~   y, which is rewritten as the second assumption in
Statement (ii).
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Setting  yt =  under the expectation of 
o
t+1 = 0 is sustained against the second option
if Z(; 0)  Z( yu;  o); that is:
()2   2 ys + ( yu)2  0,   ^;
where:
^   ys  
p
( ys)2   ( yu)2:
As  is bounded above  y; Z(; 0)  Z( yu;  o) holds if and only if  2 [^;  y]. The set
[^;  y] is nonempty if and only if ^   y, which is rewritten as the third assumption in
Statement (ii). 
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) The second assumption   f 4(w) is equivalent to  yu  1. Given the expectation
of  ot+1 = 
o, agents can choose  yt to attain the top of the Laer curve Z(
y
t ; 
o).
Suppose that at time t, agents know that  yt = 
yu and expect  ot+1 = 
o. Then,
ut+1 = U(
yu;  o) > 1=2. By (7), this implies that  ot+1 = 
o, fullling initial expectations.
Therefore, there exists an unskilled-majority equilibrium with  ot+1 = 
o if the decisive
voter nds it optimal to set  yt = 
yu.
Given the properties of the payo functions, we have the following two options: setting
 yt = 
ys under the expectation of  ot+1 = 0; or setting 
y
t =  under the expectation of
 ot+1 = 0. When the rst option is available, setting 
y
t = 
yu under the expectation of
 ot+1 = 
o is not sustained against the rst option because Z( ys; 0) > Z( yu;  o) holds.
Therefore, we impose the condition that the rst option is unfeasible,  ys   y, which is
rewritten as:
1  (1  w)2 

(1   o)2   1
2

(1 + w)(1  w)2;
where the left-hand side is always positive as w 2 [0; 1); and the right-hand side is
positive if and only if  o 2  0; (2 p2)=2. Therefore, the above inequality condition
holds if the right-hand side is either nonpositive, i.e.,  o 2 (2 p2)=2; 1=2, or positive,
i.e.,  o 2  0; (2 p2)=2 and  < f 1(w). These conditions are summarized as the rst
assumption in Statement (i).
Setting  yt = 
yu under the expectation of  ot+1 = 
o is sustained against the second
option if Z( yu;  o) > Z(; 0); that is, if
w + (1  w)2

(1   yu) + 
2
(1 + w)(1   o)2

 yu
>

w + (1  w)2

(1  ) + 
2
(1 + w)

:
This is rewritten as:
()2   2 ys + ( yu)2 > 0,  < ^;
where:
^   ys  
p
( ys)2   ( yu)2:
Therefore, Z( yu;  o) > Z(; 0) holds if and only if  < ^ as illustrated by Panel (b) in
Figure 7.
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(ii) The second assumption  > f 4(w) is equivalent to  yu > 1. Given the expectation
of  ot+1 = 
o, agents cannot choose  yt = 
yu to attain the top of the Laer curve. The tax
revenue from the young is maximized at  yt = 1 as long as the expectation is 
o
t+1 = 
o.
Suppose that at time t, agents know that  yt = 1 and expect that 
o
t+1 = 
o. Then,
ut+1 = U(1; 
o) > 1=2. By (7), this implies that  ot+1 = 
o, fullling initial expectations.
Therefore, there exists an unskilled-majority equilibrium with  ot+1 = 
o if the decisive
voter nds it optimal to set  yt = 1.
Given the properties of the payo functions, we have the following two options: setting
 yt = 
ys under the expectation of  ot+1 = 0; or setting 
y
t =  under the expectation of
 ot+1 = 0. When the rst option is available, setting 
y
t = 1 under the expectation of
 ot+1 = 
o is not sustained against the rst option, because Z( ys; 0) > Z(1;  o) holds.
Therefore, we impose the condition that the rst option is unfeasible,  ys   y, which is
rewritten as the rst assumption in Statement (ii).
Setting  yt = 1 under the expectation of 
o
t+1 = 
o is sustained against the second
option if Z(1;  o) > Z(; 0); that is, if
w + (1  w)2
2
(1 + w)(1   o)2

 1
>

w + (1  w)2

(1  ) + 
2
(1 + w)

 :
This is rewritten as:
()2   2 ys   (1  2 yu) > 0,  < ~;
where:
~   ys  
p
( ys   1)2 + 2( ys    yu):
Therefore, Z(1;  o) > Z(; 0) holds if and only if  < ~, as illustrated by Panel (a) in
Figure 7. 
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Figure 1: The timing of events and the distribution of the skilled and unskilled.
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Figure 2: The range of politically available tax rates for the old under Assumption 1.
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Figure 3: An example of solutions to the functional equation (9).
26
Figure 4: Three possible cases of the solution (10).
27
Figure 5: Revenue functions of the young. The skilled-majority equilibrium is illustrated
in Panels (a) and (b). Panel (a) is the case of  ys   y; Panel (b) is the case of  ys > y.
The unskilled-majority equilibrium is illustrated in Panels (c) and (d). Panel (c) is the
case of  yu  1; Panel (d) is the case of  yu > 1.
28
Figure 6: Illustration of function f i(i = 1; 2; 3; 4) under the assumption of  o = 0:25.
29
Figure 7: Determination of ~ (Panel (a)) and ^ (Panel (b)).
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Figure 8: Panel (a) demonstrates the numerical result of the pension{GDP ratio in
the current example; Panel (b) plots the cross-country data on wage equality and the
pension{GDP ratio. Source: OECD (2009a) for wage equality; OECD (2009b) for the
pension{GDP ratio.
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Figure 9: Panel (a) depicts the expected utility of the young; Panel (b) depicts the tax
rate on the young.
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